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ABSTRACT 
It is difficult for the firm investing in information technology (IT) to appropriate a1 
of the benefits from its investment for itself- it is very easy to imitate innovations in IT. 
Airlines have installed computerized reservations systems (CRSs) in travel agencies in 
order to appropriate the returns from their investments in information technology. The 
airlines expected to obtain a number of benefits from this strategy including increased 
efficiency, possible bias in favor of the CRS owner on the part of the travel agent, and 
fees from other airlines for making reservations for them. The purpose of this paper is 
to evaluate the impact of the indirect (non-fee) benefifs to CRS owners from deploying 
systems in travel agencies. These indirect benefits should be seen in the vendor 
airline's market share between cities and in the overall performance of the airline at an 
industry level. This paper models airline performance as a function of CRS ownership 
at two levels: for selected city-pairs and at the overall level of the firm. The city-pair 
analysis employs a multinomial logit market share model using five years of data on 72 
routes. The industry model uses longitudinal data for a panel of ten airlines for twelve 
years. The results of both analyses support hypotheses that CRS ownership is 
positively related to airline performance, It appears that strong airlines have 
appropriated the indirect benefifs of their CRSs, turning them into highly specialized 
assets for further travel-related innovation. 
KEYWORDS: Appropriability, agency automation, airline performance, business value of 
IT, computerized reservation systems, CRS, corporate strategy, market share models 
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There is a large and growing body of research which seeks to demonstrate 
benefits from investing in information technology (IT). The purpose of this paper is to 
determine if a firm can appropriate the benefits from its investment in information 
technology for itself. In particular we focus on a firm's ability to capture indirect benefits 
from investing in IT to achieve critical mass in highly competitive markets. These 
benefits extend beyond the traditional measures of cost savings and revenue directly 
attributable to a technology investment. 
1 .I Research Framework 
A firm faces a number of problems in obtaining a return from its investment 
because IT innovations are very hard to protect. Teece (1987) provides an insightful 
analysis of the innovator's problems and the choices available for the imitator or 
follower. He discusses regimes of appropriability ranging from weak to strong. 
Appropriability refers to the innovator's ability to appropriate the benefits of an 
innovation for itself. It is clear from his analysis that many IT innovations have weak 
appropriability; it is hard to protect them legally and an imitator or follower can easily 
copy the functionality of the innovation. Teece also demonstrates that firms sometimes 
succeed as an innovator or as an imitator because they have specialized assets 
needed to ensure adoption of an innovation. As an example, one reason that 
Microsoft's Internet Explorer, a Netscape imitator, has been successful is Microsoft's 
control of the operating system, a specialized asset a browser needs to operate. 
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An innovator attempts to appropriate the direct benefits from an IT investment, 
those returns originally predicted in undertaking the IT initiative. Direct benefits from an 
IT investment fall into the category of cost savings, and occasionally revenue 
generation. The innovator would also like to capture the indirect benefits of a system. 
lndirect benefits accrue because of some second-order effect of the technology, and 
often these benefits are unanticipated when the original technology investment is 
made. Table 1 describes some ways in which indirect benefits accrue to the firm that 
innovates with IT. 
Source of indirect Benefits I Examples 
Makina it easier to do business with the I Developing an ED1 capability to encourage 1 
create a positive impression of the firm I encourage customers to use FedEx for more I 
innovator 
Encouraging business by using technology to 
I shipments because of its convenience 
Using IT to provide outstanding customer I McKesson helped its independent drug store 
customersto select the innovator as a supplier 
FedEx Web site for tracking packages may 
- 
service I customers withstand the threat of drug chains I I through a variety of initiatives 
Using IT to create biased markets I Baxter's order entry system in hospitals 1 
lndirect Benefits of IT Investment 
Table 1 
In each of the examples in Table 1 a system has had a second-order impact for 
its developer. An ED1 capability saves ordering and order fulfillment costs; it also 
makes a firm with ED1 capability easier for a customer to use. The FedEx Web site is 
very impressive. The company will reduce costs through less use of its 800 customer 
service number and the need for fewer service agents. FedEx should obtain indirect 
benefits as the site encourages customers to place more business with the carrier. 
McKesson developed its Economost system to reduce its costs and increase volume; 
by providing superb customer service and innovative programs for its pharmacy 
customers, it helped keep these independent stores in business (Clemons and Row, 
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1988). Finally, indirect benefits accrue from biased markets, a results of many 
proprietary order entry systems (Malone, Benjamin and Yates, 1987). Customers find 
these systems easy and attractive to use; the innovator biases the market by featuring 
its own products only or by giving them preference. 
It is not easy to classify IT investment as direct and indirect without knowing the 
original justification for the IT initiative. We believe that the indirect benefits in Table 1 
were not anticipated when the companies made their original investments; these 
benefits would certainly have been difficult to forecast a priori In general, the greater 
the distance in business process terms between where the investment occurs and 
where benefits appear, the more likely that the benefits are "indirect." 
1.2 Airline CRS, Appropriability and Biased Markets 
The airline industry provides one opportunity to examine an effort to appropriate 
the benefits of a technological innovation and to assess the indirect benefits of 
investing in IT. American developed the first airline computerized reservations system 
(CRS) in order to prevent an uncontrolled escalation in costs that would result from its 
manual reservations system when jet travel began (Copeland and McKenney, 1985). 
However, CRSs have weak appropriability regimes; other airlines, including United, 
quickly imitated American. IBM offered a packaged system called PARS to any airline 
based on its joint work with American in developing the SABRE system. 
One way for the CRS developer to protect its innovation was to offer the system 
to travel agents, thus building an installed base of CRS locations. The CRS vendor 
would gain by creating a biased market favoring its flights. Expanding the system to 
travel agents also required including more capabilities in the system like the ability to 
reserve rental cars and hotel rooms. The CRS system, itself, became a highly 
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specialized asset for its vendors that an airline needs to offer further innovative travel 
services. 
In 1976 United and American Airlines began installing terminals, connected to 
the airlines' computerized reservations systems, in travel agents' offices (Copeland and 
McKenney, 1985). Several other airlines quickly imitated their behavior. We believe 
that CRS vendor airlines did so to protect their innovation. They received direct 
benefits from booking fees and charges to travel agents and obtained indirect benefits 
through biased markets and outstanding customer service. The airlines strengthened 
their appropriability regime (their ability to appropriate the benefits of innovation) while 
turning the reservations systems into highly specialized assets for further travel-related 
innovation. 
Many of the indirect benefits described above are enjoyed by all airlines whose 
flights are listed in a CRS. What are the indirect benefits to the owner of a system? 
The Economics literature suggest that the value of a network increases as the number 
of its locations increases (Farrell and Saloner (1986); Saloner and Shepard (1995)). 
How might indirect benefits accrue to a CRS vendor as its number of agency locations 
reaches a critical mass? One example is extra bookings due to screen bias. Until it 
was eliminated by government regulation in 1984, CRS vendors routinely listed their 
own flights first on the reservations display. Since it has been estimated that over 90% 
of flights are booked from the first screen, this bias favored the airline. Even though 
rules by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) at first, and later by the Department of 
Transportation, attempted to eliminate screen bias, non-CRS vendors have continued 
to assert that subtle biases in systems favor CRS vendors (Lyle, 1988; Borenstein, 
1991). 
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Another indirect benefit for the CRS vendor is the "halo" effect. Copeland and 
McKenney (1988) define the halo effect as "a tendency to book more passengers on 
the flights of the airline that supplies a travel agency's reservations than would 
otherwise be the case." This favoritism might come about because of more familiarity 
with the airline and contact with its personnel, a favorable impression of the airline 
created by its technological capabilities, or the overall benefits of the CRS for the 
agent. As deployment of the technology reaches a critical mass, these benefits 
become more likely to occur. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
We predict that indirect benefits increase a CRS vendor's market share beyond 
what might be expected in cities where the vendor has high agency penetration. 
Assuming that CRS technologies alone did not change market demand for airline 
reservations, a travel agent's favoritism for a CRS vendor's flights increases the 
vendor's business in a market at the expense of its competitors. Higher market share 
in enough individual markets should then be reflected in stronger airline performance at 
the industry level. This reasoning leads to two hypotheses related to the indirect 
benefits of CRS ownership and deployment in travel agencies: 
Hypothesis I :  A CRS vendor's deployment of agency automation in local 
markets will be positively associated with that airline's market share of revenue- 
producing passenger miles between the city-pairs comprising its route structure. 
Hypothesis 2: A CRS vendor's national installed base of agencies will be 
positively associated with the airline's overall performance. 
The paper first presents a city-pair model to assess the impact of CRS 
ownership and deployment on the vendor's market share in selected cities. Then we 
formulate a firm-level econometric model of airline performance to estimate the impact 
of agency automation on the overall performance of ten major domestic airlines. 
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2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
This section presents an overview of selected prior research on IT and firm 
performance; it also examines literature on the economics of the airline industry to 
develop our models of the impact of CRS on firm performance. 
2.1. The Impact of Technology on Performance 
As early as the 1970s, there was interest in the impact of information systems 
on firm performance; see Table 2. Lucas (1975) found that information system usage 
was not a very good predictor of performance among more than 200 California bank 
branches. Cron and Sobol (1983) found that surgical warehousing companies making 
extensive use of information technology (IT) were either very strong or very weak 
financial performers. Turner (1 985) reported little evidence to suggest that mutual 
savings banks which made relatively larger investments in IT compared to industry 
competitors performed better. 
After these early studies, researchers began to study specific industries in 
depth. Venkatraman and Zaheer (1990), for example, reported that insurance agencies 
that adopted new technology generated more new business, though these agencies 
also started out with a better record on new business than matched firms that had not 
yet implemented the new system. Harris and Katz (1991) looked at the use of 
information technology in the insurance industry as well, and reported conflicting results 
on the impact of IT. 
In banking, Banker and Kauffman (1988) also found little evidence of value from 
investments in automated teller machine (ATM) network technology. Instead, their 
empirical results showed that ATM deployment helped to protect a bank branch's 
deposit base rather than extend it greatly; only a very restricted set of competitive 
conditions were found to be conducive to the creation of this kind of business value 
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through ATM deployment. Dos Santos and Peffers (1 995) have conducted a rigorous 
econometric study using time-series data from the Federal Reserve Bank to determine 
the business value of electronic banking. The results of this study were also mixed in 
terms of the return from investing in ATMs; early adopters of IT were able to increase 
profitability and market share, but late adopters were only able to increase profitability, 
not market share. 
Summary of Selected Business Value Research 
Table 2 
In manufacturing, Loveman (1994) showed IT created little value in terms of the 
Findings 
Usage not a strong predictor of 
performance 
Highest users of IT either strong 
or weak performers 
Little relationship between 
investment in IT and better 
performance than competition 
Agencies with new IT generated 
more new business, but they had 
been best performers before 
automation 
Conflicting results: weak positive 
relationship between IT and 
performance 
Market share model showed little 
added value from ATM 
investment; protected 
competitive position 
Mixed results from adopting 
ATMs 
Little relationship between IT 
investment and sector output 
Found IT investment related only 
to transactions processing 
applications 
Greater impact found at SBU 
than firm level 
High positive return at the firm 
level for IT investments 
sector's output productivity, despite his use of well-accepted econometric methods and 
TheoryIModel 
Proposed model of IS 
use and performance 
An evaluation 
framework for IS 
Proposed theory of job 
design 
Quasi-experimental 
design; theory of 
strategic advantage 
Strategic value of IT 
impacts 
Strategic value of IT 
Value chain and 
econometric analysis 
Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
Proposed model of use 
and performance 
Microeconomic model 
at SBU and firm level 
Cobb-Douglas 
production function 
Authors 
Lucas (1 975) 
Cron and 
Sobol(l983) 
Turner(l985) 
Venkatraman and 
Zaheer (1 990) 
Harris and Katz 
(1 991) 
Banker and 
Kauffman (1 988) 
Dos Santos and 
Peffen (1 995) 
Loveman (1 994) 
Weill (1 992) 
Barua, Kriebel 
and 
Mukhopadhyay 
(1 995) 
Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt (1996,1994) 
* 
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Sample 
Bank 
branches 
Surgical 
warehouse 
firms 
Mutual 
savings 
banks 
Insurance 
agencies 
Life 
insurance 
firms 
Banks 
Banks 
Manufact- 
uring firms 
Valve 
manufact- 
uring firms 
Manufact- 
uring firms 
Industry 
level data 
a solid da ta  set .  For valve manufacturing firms, Weill (1992) found that t h e  only 
relationship between investments in technology and  firm performance w a s  for 
transact'ional applications. Here, a firm could obtain direct cost  savings, for example, 
through a materials requirements planning system. Also in manufacturing, Barua, 
Kriebel a n d  Mukhopadhyay (1995) examined the value of IT by modeling performance 
a t  two levels. At the  business process level, they found that IT improved capacity 
utilization and  inventory turnover, and  supported quality control; however, there w a s  
little impact on  new product introduction. Overall the firm level effects of IT, including 
return o n  a s s e t s  and  market share ,  were  much weaker. 
Brynjolfsson and  Hitt (1996), using firm-level data across  a large number of 
companies, found a surprisingly high return from firms' investments in information 
technology, 54% in manufacturing and  68% combining manufacturing and  services 
firms. T h e s e  results a r e  somewhat controversial, in spite of the  methodological ca re  
taken by the  authors in modeling firm performance. In studies that employ this level of 
analysis, aggregation of the  da ta  make it very difficult to ensure  that information 
technology investments a r e  measured in a consistent manner across  firms. For 
example, the  da tabase  in this research appears  to have contained only centralized 
expenditures on  IT, not decentralized spending a t  the  department level. 
A study by the s a m e  authors found that IT w a s  associated with increased 
productivity. Capital investments in technology had a high return of 87%. However, IT 
investment w a s  not related to shareholder return, return on  equity o r  return o n  a s s e t s  
(Brynjolfsson and  Hitt, 1994). 
In general, research on  the  level of the  individual firm h a s  not found a consistent 
a n d  strong relationship between investments in IT and  firm performance, though s o m e  
of t h e  more recent studies show more positive results. There  is a popular belief, as 
witnessed by cover stories in leading business magazines (Fortune, J u n e  117, 1994), 
that IT d o e s  have a payoff. Brynjolfsson (1993) provides reasons  why a negative view 
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of returns from investing in IT may be the result of definitional, measurement and data 
problems. It is also possible that it has taken longer than expected for investments in 
technology to show a return, and that more carefully designed IT value research is now 
beginning to find a payoff from investing in IT 
2.2. Research on Airline Performance 
There have been a number of studies of the airline industry, a few of which 
have performed econometric analyses of airline performance; see Table 3. Caves, 
Christensen and Tretheway (1 981) estimated total factor productivity for 11 major 
~ r e t h e w a ~  (1 981) 
Sickles (1 985) 
Study I TheoryIModel 
Caves. Christensen and I Total factor 
productivity 
Key Variables I Results 
Three passenger I Higher productivity 
Nonlinear 
production function 
and two freight 
outputs, five 
categories of inputs 
Capital, labor, 
materials and 
energy related to 
associated with 
longer average 
stage lengths and 
higher load factors 
Capital and labor 
contribute to 
productivity growth 
Sickles, Good and 
Johnson(l986) 
Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles 
(1 990) 
--- 
Borenstein (1 991) 
Department of Transportation 
(1988) 
1 
Production function 
for market share 
(linear) 
Input-output model 
of allocative 
efficiency for multi- 
output firms 
Frontier production 
function 
Revenue share 
predicted by airport 
dominance, tourist 
traffic, schedule 
and airline CRS 
Production function 
capacity ton miles 
Capital, labor, 
energy and 
materials predict 
revenues 
Same as above 
including stage 
length 
Revenue share 
predicted by 
departures and 
overrides 
regulatory changes 
Overrides and 
Deregulation 
lowered total costs 
and improved 
allocative 
efficiency 
An increase in 
efficiency after 
Banker and Johnston (1 995) 
departures are 
associated with 
revenue share for 
an airline 
Dominant airline at 
Multiplicative 
competitive 
interaction model 
(MCI) for airline 
airport had 
disproportionate 
share of traffic; 
CRS coefficient 
share 
Airline market 
share in city-pairs, 
CRS deployment 
insignificant 
CRS deployment in 
agencies positively 
related to market 
share 
I market share I I 
Summary of Airline Performance Research 
Table 3 
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airlines. These researchers looked at five output variables primarily related to revenue, 
and five inputs. They estimated a total factor productivity index for each airline and 
analyzed differences in productivity. These authors found that airlines with longer 
average stage lengths (average length of flights on the airline) and higher load factors 
had higher productivity. 
Sickles ( I  985) tested a nonlinear model of technology and specific factor 
productivity growth on a panel of sixteen domestic US airlines from 1970 to 1978. His 
model includes estimates of capital, labor, energy and materials inputs. Sickles used 
these variables to estimate a cost function describing the firm's production technology. 
During this time period, the growth rate in factor productivity averaged about 2.6% a 
year, with capital and labor being the dominant causal factors. He noted that time- 
specific random effects on performance were small, but that firm-specific effects were 
important. 
Sickles, Good and Johnson (1986) extended the data set in the study above to 
include quarterly figures from 1970 through 1981 in order to evaluate airline 
deregulation. They constructed a model of airline performance for thirteen carriers 
using capital, labor, energy and materials as input to predict passenger and cargo 
revenues. The results suggest that deregulation lowered total costs and improved 
allocative inefficiency. Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) used the same data set 
for eight airlines and included seasonal dummies in their equation along with average 
stage length and a quality measure. They found an increase in efficiency from 82% in 
1972 to 95% in 1980. 
The Department of Transportation (1988) developed a model of an airline's 
share of revenue from agents using its CRS for one year, focusing on commission 
overrides paid by the airlines. The independent variables in this model included the 
vendor's share of scheduled departures in a market, the square of the vendor's share 
of scheduled departures, and a series of dummy variables indicating whether the travel 
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agent received an override (an extra payment for booking a flight on that airline) from 
each airline in the model (US Department of Transportation, 1988). 
This model was estimated for travel agents using a CRS for the year 1986 in 57 
consolidated metropolitan statistical areas containing large and medium hubs. The 
study found an association between the CRS vendor airline's share of scheduled 
departures and the share of revenues it receives from agents using its CRS. Overrides 
were associated with higher bookings for the airline offering them and fewer bookings 
for competing airlines. 
Borenstein (1991) studied the advantage that a dominant airline has in a 
particular market. His study is one of the few that has examined airline market share 
for specific cities. His model included airport dominance measures, tourist traffic, 
schedule convenience, and airline CRS share. Borenstein's CRS variable measured 
the proportion of revenues on all CRSs in a city that are conducted on a carrier's 
system. He used data from 1200 city-pair markets in the U.S. for the second quarter of 
1986. Borenstein's measure of market share was based on an airline's share of the 
round-trip traffic between two cities. The model explained 15% of the variance in 
market share, and the CRS coefficient was small and insignificant in predicting market 
share. In general the dominant airline at an airport attracted a disproportionate share 
of traffic, though the magnitude of this advantage was small and difficult to assess. 
Finally, there is one study by Banker and Johnston (1995) that modeled airline 
market share in selected cities using a multiplicative competitive interaction (MCI) 
model. MCI models use production function modeling and analysis techniques to 
represent the relative strengths of competitors' marketing mix choices in achieving 
market share. A second model examined the impact of the use of a CRS on its owner's 
costs of providing reservations services. Independent variables in the study included 
the number of travel agencies using a CRS vendor's system, the average fare per 
revenue passenger mile, number of destinations served, frequency of flights, 
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advertising, hours of reservations labor and travel agent commissions. Data for the 
study covered quarters from 1981 to 1985 and included 23 airlines. The MCI model 
explained 95% of the variance in market share during the period. The contribution of 
the CRS variables was positive and significant in predicting market share. 
2.3 Summary of CRS Results: Findings and Limitations 
A relatively small number of studies have addressed the impact of airline 
computerized reservation systems on airline performance. The researchers employed 
varied theoretical and evaluative perspectives drawn from microeconomics and 
marketing science, including the analysis of airline production and market shares. Their 
research designs varied from large single period cross-sectional analysis, to more 
extensive, multi-quarter and multi-year panel data analysis. Only two of three studies 
that mention CRS actually focus on them; the DOT (1988) was interested in 
commission overrides rather than CRS impact. A CRS independent variable predicting 
airline market share is significant in only one of two studies that included it. Research 
to date, either on business value or airline performance, has provided only limited 
evidence for the indirect benefits accruing to airline CRS vendors from deploying their 
reservations systems in travel agencies. 
3. RESEARCH MODEL, MODELING ISSUES AND DATA 
Prior research on the business value of IT and airline performance has drawn 
on multiple theoretical perspectives, including strategic management, organizational 
behavior and microeconomics. Studies that utilized economic theory often adopted 
some form of production function relating airline performance output measures to 
various input factors such as capital and labor. They also employed techniques such 
as total factor productivity assessment, Cobb-Douglas production function estimation, 
econometric analysis of the business process and the value chain, and market share 
modeling. 
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3.1 The General Model 
Our study, consistent with almost all of the airline performance and some of the 
business value research we reviewed, relies on production economics. We model the 
indirect impact of CRS in terms of four dependent variables, including market share, 
revenue passenger miles, load factor and operating profits. We perform analyses of 
CRS value at two levels of aggregation: at the city-pair level and at the industry level. 
To estimate market share effects of airline agency automation at the city-pair level, we 
adapted a model from the marketing science literature (Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988). 
This model allows us to test for network size-dependent value in regional competition, 
and incorporate the possibility of a "threshold" or "critical mass" effect for CRS 
deployment. This specification of the model was chosen to tie in closely with our 
framework explaining how a firm appropriates benefits from an IT investment. To 
assess the indirect impact of CRS ownership on the overall performance of an airline at 
the industry level, we employ several different econometric models. 
The independent variable for testing our hypotheses, CRS locations, measures 
the number of travel agencies using a particular CRS vendor's system in each year of 
the study. The model also includes other explanatory variables which were the most 
significant in prior research, and which appear to be important control variables in 
estimating an airline's ability to appropriate the benefits of CRS deployment. Average 
stage length summarizes information about an airline's fixed and variable costs of 
operation for a given route structure. A longer stage length should be associated with 
lower costs and higher revenues. The number of departures measures an airline's 
accessibility to customers; more departures generally provide greater convenience for 
travelers, increasing the airline's attractiveness to the market. In general, we expect 
advertising to be weakly associated with performance based on its significance in past 
research. The presence of a strike can significantly disrupt airline operations and 
impact performance. It is also likely that airline fares influence performance, especially 
market share for leisure travelers. 
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This study tests two models of airline performance,* at the city-pair and the 
national level, of the general form shown in Equation 1: 
Airline-Performance = f(STAGE, #-DEPARTS, AD-EXP,STRIKE,FARE, 
CRS-LOC) 
3.2 Variables and Data Collection 
The two major airline CRS vendors are American and United. These two carriers 
had about 70% of the agency automation business in the U.S. during the period of the 
study. Delta, Eastern and TWA also adopted a strategy of agency automation, but 
their market share was low. The CRS vendor airlines and systems included in this 
study are American (SABRE), United (APOLLO), Delta (DATAS ll), TWA (PARS) and 
Eastern (SYSTEMONE). Since the purpose of this paper is to assess the ability of 
airline CRS vendors to appropriate the indirecf benefits of agency automation, we do 
not consider the revenue generated by reservations systems in the form of charges to 
7
other airlines for booking their flights. 
Table 4 contains the variables in the study. We model the indirect benefits of 
CRS ownership by measuring the number of travel agencies, CRS-LOCI using a CRS 
vendor's system following a strategy first used by Banker and Johnston (1995). This 
variable measures the penetration of a vendor's CRS into the travel agency market. 
Copeland has carefully developed time-series estimates of the number of travel 
agencies with terminals installed by each of the major CRS vendors at the industry level 
(Copeland and McKenney, 1988). On the local level, a study by an industry research 
In any study there is the possibility of omitted variables. The most serious omissions in the 
present study are the influence of frequent flyer programs (FFP) and commission overrides. 
There is very little data available on frequent flyer programs and their impact; since all airline 
had or soon developed these programs, their impact on the industry model over its 12-year 
period should be minimal. FFPs might influence the city-pair results, but the nature of that 
impact is difficult to predict. To examine FFPs, one would need quarterly data on enrollment, as 
well as announcements and responses by rival airlines. Similarly, it is expected that special 
commission and overrides should average out over the period of the national model, though they 
could influence the city-pair results. 
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firm provided data on the distribution of CRS among travel agencies in selected cities 
for a five-year period. 
The average stage length, STAGE, is the average length in miles of all an 
airline's flights between the city pairs in its route structure. In general, a longer average 
stage length is associated with better financial performance during the period of the 
study. A longer stage length implies fewer landings and take-offs per revenue 
passenger mile of flight. Airlines with longer stage lengths should have lower fixed 
costs relative to variable costs compared with their competitors. 
A major source of data for this study is the I.P. Sharp electronic airline database 
(Reuters1l.P. Sharp Ltd, 1988a and b). This database is derived from the Department 
City- 
Pair 
Model 
of Transportation Form 41, and includes comprehensive information on many aspects 
Variables 
of airline operations and finance that are used in making decisions about airline 
Source Definition 
Independent 
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Industry 
Model 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Copeland & 
McKenny 
(1 985); 
Industry 
research firm 
I.P. Sharp 
I.P. Sharp 
BARILNA 
DOT records; 
periodical 
literature 
I.P. Sharp 
CRS-LOC 
STAGE 
# DEPARTS 
AD EXP 
STRIKE 
FARE 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Number of travel agencies 
nationally with CRS 
Number of travel agencies in 
city-pair markets with CRS 
Average length in miles of all a 
carrier's flights 
Number of departing flights 
Advertising/promotion expenses 
Occurrence of a strike during 
period 
Average fare on route 
Dependent 
X 
Data Sources 
Table 4 
X 
X 
X 
I.P. Sharp 
I.P. Sharp 
I.P. Sharp 
I.P. Sharp 
RPM 
LOAD 
PROFIT 
MS 
Revenue passenger miles 
Load factor 
Operating profit 
Market share based on RPM for 
a city-pair route 
regulations. It also includes a 10% sample of all airline tickets used in the U.S.--what 
the DOT calls the "ODIA Database" in its raw form-- and maintains a file of true origin- 
destination data describing an airline's operations. The Sharp database provided 
information on average stage length for each airline in the study. 
The number of departures, #-DEPARTS, is also generally correlated with airline 
revenue. Borenstein (1991) discusses several studies which have showed that airlines 
with a large share of capacity on a route receive a disproportionate share of traffic. 
One explanation is that customers are aware of this dominance and call the airline they 
assume will have the most convenient departure. This effect has diminished over time, 
however, as more reservations are made through travel agents. 
Data on airline expenditures on print advertising were obtained from a major 
advertising firm's Leading National Advertiser's (LNA) database, and data on broadcast 
expenditures were obtained from the Arbitron Ratings Company Broadcast Advertiser's 
Reports (BAR). These expenditures for each airline on print and broadcast advertising 
were summed to create the advertising variable, AD-EXP. 
We also considered the effects of strikes through a dummy variable, STRIKE, 
representing the presence or absence of a strike in a given year in the city-pair data 
set. Strikes were identified from Department of Transportation records, the Air 
Transport Association of America conference proceedings (1 987), and industry 
periodicals. The STRIKE variable was not included in our industry level models; limited 
duration strikes had little or no impact on aggregate airline performance. Moreover, the 
air traffic controllers' strike did not appear to affect yearly performance statistics 
differentially by airline. For example, load factors and revenue passenger miles fell 
from 1979 through 1980 and generally began to increase again in 1981. However, the 
pattern was similar across all of the carriers in the study. Because the city-pair data 
encompass fewer years, strikes are considered in the analysis at this level. 
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We modeled an airline's ticket prices using a variable called FARE, to represent 
the average fare between two cities in the city-pair analysis. This variable is also based 
on I. P. Sharp data, and was computed by dividing total revenue on a city-pair route by 
the number of paying passengers for each carrier. 
The next three variables in Table 3 are airline performance measures, and were 
also taken from the I.P. Sharp database. Revenue passenger miles (RPM) is the total 
number of miles flown by paying passengers on the airline each year. A revenue 
passenger mile is defined as a paying passenger flying one mile on the airline; it is not 
a direct measure of revenue as it only shows the fact the passenger was paying, not 
how much was paid. Load factor (LOAD) is the average percentage of seats filled with 
paying passengers during the year. If a plane has 100 paying passengers and a 
capacity of 200 passengers, the load factor for that flight is 50%. 
For this study, operating profit (PROFIT) is defined as operating revenues minus 
expenses and is a short-term measure. Expenses related to aircraft depreciation and 
leasing have been removed as they are not considered controllable in the short run. As 
mentioned earlier, fees from CRS subsidiaries are also excluded from this measure by 
subtracting the "miscellaneous revenue" account on Form 41 where CRS fees are 
reported, from revenues. 
The final dependent variable is market share (MS) defined as an airline's 
percentage of total revenue passenger miles for all carriers between two cities. We 
were able to compute an airline's market share of revenue passenger miles with 
reference to the origin-destination data from the DOT'S ODIA database. 
4.0 THE CITY-PAIR LEVEL: MODEL AND RESULTS 
Market share models enable the evaluation of the relationship between 
variables describing a firm's decisions about how to configure itself to sell products and 
services, and its resulting market share. We use CRS installed base and other 
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independent variables from Table 4 to constitute each airline's strategy or "marketing 
mix". The variables in the model determine the relative attractiveness to the consumer 
of choosing to fly on the airline. 
4.1. The City-Pair Route Market Share Model 
A desirable feature of a market share model is that it should provide predictions 
of equilibrium market shares that firms should achieve based on the marketing mixes 
they select, as the market moves towards equilibrium. Unlike anarytical models of 
market share, empirical models are not intended to depict the process by which 
equilibrium results, nor can we necessarily expect them to guarantee predictions that 
match what we might expect to see occur in equilibrium (as a game theoretic model 
might yield). 
A second desirable feature of a market share model is that its estimates are 
logically consistent with what we know about the mechanics of market share. Thus, a 
model which produces market share estimates that are either greater than 100% or less 
than 0% -- which is likely to happen with simple linear models of market share -- fails to 
incorporate relevant information. Market share models that enable logically consistent 
estimates are usually specified in ratio form (Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988; Jain and 
Mahajan, 1979), as follows: 
MSic = I f (XicsP) 
This particular form of a market share model incorporates the function f(.) in the 
numerator to measure the strength of airline i's marketing mix, represented by a vector 
of variables X, to achieve market share on a city-pair route c, weighted by the 
denominator which reflects the set of decisions made by all I competitors in the market. 
Taken together, the numerator and denominator in the model act to normalize the 
resulting estimates of market share and ensure logically consistent estimates. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
Working Paper IS-96-19 
4.1.1. Selecting a Model. In order to use a model of the form in Equation 2 to 
estimate the impact of CRS on city-pair market shares, we made several tactical 
decisions that would allow us to provide evidence for the appropriability of the benefits 
from CRS deployment. The first was to determine the form of the function f(.). 
When a multiplicative function is selected the resulting model is a ratio of two 
simple Cobb-Douglas production functions and is called a multiplicative competitive 
interaction (MCI) model. Similar to Cobb-Douglas function analysis, the coefficients for 
the marketing mix variables have a straightforward interpretation as percentage 
changes in market share for unit changes in their values. The MCI model has been 
found to be a useful modeling approach in numerous studies during the past decade 
(Ghosh and Craig, 1983; Nakanishi and Cooper, 1974; Banker and Kauffman, 1988; 
Cooper, 1988; and Banker and Johnston, 1995). When an exponential function is 
selected, the resulting model is called a multinomial logit (MNL) model; other functional 
forms are possible as well. 
Different functional forms result in quite different market share elasticities 
(Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988), some of which are better suited than others for 
providing evidence of the importance of installed base and critical mass in agency 
automation. Market share elasticity is defined as the ratio of the relative change in 
market share corresponding to a change in a marketing mix variable. Assuming k = 
1, ..., K marketing mix variables in set K for airline i, we can express the point elasticity, 
el of airline i's market share, MSi, with respect to any single variable, Xki, as: 
6' MSi  MSi 
ehnsi = 3 Xki 1 Xki 
(3) 
For unit changes in the value of a marketing mix variable, the respective point 
elasticity estimates for the MCI and MNL models are Pk(l-MSi) and Pk(l-MSi)xki. The 
MCI elasticity expression declines monotonically as increases in xki lead to improving 
market share. On the other hand, the MNL elasticity increases over some range of 
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values of xki, and then declines, suggesting a threshold impact on market share. *This 
pattern is consistent with our belief that a CRS vendor's agency automation program 
needs to achieve a critical mass before there are impacts on market share, and that 
eventually the CRS impact on market share should decline. Thus, in contrast to Banker 
and Johnston, we have chosen an MNL model which takes into account both the 
installed base and the need for a critical mass of CRS locations. 
4.1 -2. Variables in the City-Pair Model. The dependent variable for the city- 
pair analysis is market share based on each carrier's percentage of revenue passenger 
miles between an origin and destination city. We expect that market share is a function 
of agency automation, as well as several other independent variables included in past 
airline performance research. 
The independent variable of most interest to us is the number of travel agencies 
using a vendor's CRS, our measure for the installed base of reservations systems. 
Terminals are installed during the year and there is likely to be a learning curve for 
agency personnel. Thus, the full impact of automating a location should be felt during 
the year after the automation occurs. Note that the installed base of terminals is 
growing each year for the CRS vendor during the study period. Consequently, the 
models use a lagged CRS locations variable. 
We include the following variables, xk, from among the marketing mix variables 
shown in Table 3 in our city-pair market analysis: 
number of travel agencies with a vendor's CRS (x cRs-Loc,t-*); 
number of departures from the origin city (x # - D E P A ~ ~ ~ ) ;  
advertising expense (x AD - EXP); 
average fare on the route (x and, 
occurrence of a strike during the period (x STRIKE). 
The number of departures has been found to be correlated with airline 
performance (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1988). An airline with more 
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departures should have a larger market share, indicating a potential source of 
heteroskedasticity in our model. Based on prior findings (Doganis, 1985) we expect to 
find a weak association between advertising and market share. We also expect fares to 
influence market share at the city-pair level because airlines are quite competitive on 
given routes. A strike can have a major impact on the market share of an airline 
between two cities. Average stage length, a variable in past airline performance 
research, is a constant since each competitor flies the same number of miles between 
a given city-pair; therefore, it is not included in the city-pair model. 
Equation 4 shows the fully specified form of the model for the city-pair .analysis; 
it includes the one-year lagged value of CRS locations in the origin city of the city-pair 
along with advertising, number of departures, fare and strikes. 
The multinomial logit estimation form of this model includes an exponential 
attractiveness function of the marketing mix variables, which ensures that our 
assumption about elasticity of market share will hold. Ratio models cannot be 
estimated directly using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because they are non- 
linear. However, one can perform ordinary least squares estimation after a log- 
centering transformation. This process involves taking logarithms of the differences 
between the values of the independent variables and their arithmetic means. For the 
dependent variable, the raw value for market share is divided by the geometric mean 
market share, and then the logarithm of that expression is taken. Following this 
transformation, the model becomes a special case of other log-linear market share 
models, as discussed in Cooper and Nakanishi (1988). See Appendix A for additional 
details. 
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4.2. City-Pair Selection and Data Set Refinement 
We obtained data for the city-pair model covering all 132 of the DOT's ODIA- 
listed domestic carriers in the five year period from 1983 to 1987, for 21 0 city pairs (1 5 
origins by 14 destinations). The data set was culled to include 2309 observations in the 
following four steps: 
Step 1 - Elimination of Airline Hubs: Although the city-pairs we considered are all 
designated as "large hubs" by government regulators (US. Department of 
Transportation, 1988; U.S. Senate, 1989), not all of these cities are used as 
"operational hubs" by the airlines. We eliminated from consideration all origin and 
destination cities that acted as "operational hubsi' for a carrier (e.g., Newark, 
DallasIFort Worth, Atlanta, St. Louis, and   oust on.)^ 
Step 2 - Elimination of One Year of Data Due to Lag: By lagging the CRS 
locations (CRS-LOC) variable one year (t-I), we lost the observations for 1983. 
Step 3 - Elimination of Irrelevant Competitors: We also eliminated from 
consideration all carriers whose market share in a given city-pair was less than or 
equal to 1%. This step narrowed the list of admissible airlines from the DOT's 132 
ODIA-listed airlines for the five-year period down to about 30-35. 
Step 4 - Elimination of Carriers with Insufficient Observations: Based on 
additional diagnostic work on the data set, we determined that separate intercepts 
for approximately 15-20 minor carriers could not be estimated. In most cases, their 
market shares were either just above our 1 % cutoff or the airline had a slightly 
larger share, but was not represented in enough time periods or in enough city-pairs 
to estimate an intercept. Although we analyzed this data using the 
heteroskedasticity-corrected models whose results are discussed in Section 4.3., 
we were only able to do so by cumulating the observations to establish a "unit" or 
"small carrier" intercept. The "small carrier" intercept was insignificant, however, 
and further analysis of these observations as potential outliers suggested that we 
omit them from further consideration. The most notable omission for this reason 
was Pacific Southwest Airlines. 
This process resulted in data from nine cities: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco and Washington, D.C. 
(Because these cities were not "operational hubs" during the period of this study, we 
By contrast, the non-operational hubs of Denver, Detroit and Seattle were omitted because of 
missing data on agency automation. 
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do not include a hub independent variable.) The steps yielded 72 city-pairs (9 by 8) for 
analysis, when pairs with identical origins were eliminated. The resulting data set 
covers the time when CRS vendors were actively competing for an installed base in 
travel agencies. Copeland and McKenney (1988) indicate that by 1987 an estimated 
95% of agencies were automated and competition changed to displacing an existing 
vendors' CRS in order to install one's own. 
4.3.1. Econometric Issues 
The econometric issues we addressed prior to estimation of the model included 
native collinearity (both painvise correlation and multicollinearity), model-induced 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and omitted variables. A painvise 
correlation analysis ensured that no two variables were too highly correlated, and the 
Belsley-Kuh-Welch test (1980) suggested multicollinearity was not a problem. In 
addition, with the many airline intercepts included in the model, there was a strong 
possibility of model-induced multicollinearity. However, Steps 3 and 4 of our data 
selection process resolved this issue. 
The possibility of autocorrelated disturbances is somewhat more difficult to address 
effectively. There could be potential gains from first-differencing the data (as in the 
MCI model of Banker and Johnston, 1995) or moving to a first-order autoregressive 
(e.g. AR(1)) specification for the error term disturbance. However, in this study we had 
insufficient observations in our time-series to make first differencing work. A second 
alternative, to correct the covariance matrix for autocorrelation (e.g., using Kmenta's 
(1986) procedure), would have resulted in the loss of many more observations due to 
our unbalanced sample, leaving just the very largest airlines. The diagnostic alternative 
we chose was to examine individual years cross-sectionally, then run a sub-sample with 
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the first ( I  984) and the last (1987) years of the data, and, finally, examine the stability 
of the coefficient estimates across all the sub-samples. We observed stable coefficient 
estimates throughout, with only minor exceptions that were unrelated to the CRS 
locations variable. 
The city-pairs included in our analysis exhibit two-firm market shares that varied 
between 69% and 89% during the period, 1983 to 1987. Such oligopolistic competition 
almost guarantees the presence of heteroskedastic  error^.^ We confirmed the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and obtained unbiased estimators in two ways: 
Firsf, we used the Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) F-test with the observations split on the 
basis of rank-ordered number of departures from the origin city in a city-pair 
(#-DEPARTS), to proxy for larger and smaller firms. We tested both with and 
without an appropriately sized holdout sample of "middle-sized" firms and obtained 
similar confirmatory resu~ts.~ Next, we used #-DEPARTS as the weighting variable 
to correct for heteroskedasticity. Then, we performed weighted least squares 
(Greene, 1990). 
Second, we used the less restrictive Breusch-Pagan (1979) X2 test of 
homoskedasticity. The test results prompted us to reject homoskedasticity, so we 
corrected the data for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) estimator, which 
produces unbiased least squares estimates. 
In both cases, the estimation models yielded reasonable and similar results. 
We prefer the results of the second analysis, especially given its treatment of variables 
that may be omitted from our analysis. It is difficult to know the "rightJJ functional form 
that relates the proxy variable for firm size to the error variance, though we prefer the 
A second potential source, similar to what is seen in macroeconomic studies of inflation and 
unemployment, occurs when the variance of the forecast error depends on the size of prior 
disturbances, Var[st I 1, s=l ,..., S. For example, it is possible that an omitted variable (such as 
announcements about the move to deregulation in the industry, with its different effects on 
different size firms), might have had an effect that persisted over time. Our model does not 
consider this form of heteroskedasticity. 
Omitting observations increases the power of the test up to a point. Harvey and Phillips (1974) 
indicate that no more than one-third of the observations should be dropped, while Goldfeld and 
Quandt have demonstrated applications involving 15% to 20% holdout samples. 
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simple intuition of a proportional effect. Breusch-Pagan (1979) is tailored to situations 
where it is difficult to identify what might cause heteroskedasticity. 
4.3.2. Estimation Results. Table 5 presents the results from the MNL market share 
analysis using White's covariance matrix correction. The results support Hypothesis 1: 
the lagged CRS variable is significant at the .001 level and has a positive coefficient, 
indicating a positive relationship to market share of revenue passenger miles. This 
coefficient represents the impact on log-centered market share of the difference 
between the number of CRS locations deployed by airline i and the mean number of all 
competitors' CRS agency locations in the origin city at time t. The CRS coefficient is 
second in significance only to the number of departures. 
Based on 2309 observations, the model explains over 55% of the variance in 
log-centered market share. Four of the five main effects coefficients were significant in 
our primary tests, and the effects were also evident in our secondary tests; only 
advertising expenditures were not significant. The number of departing flights, as 
expected, is positively related to market share, while strikes, although seldom occurring 
during the period, appear to do visible harm. 
The positive coefficient in Table 5 for FARE is somewhat surprising, though it is 
consistent with past research. One would think a prion that lower rather than higher 
fares would be associated with market share. Are the airlines exercising market 
power? Are their customers exhibiting their willingness-to-pay for building frequent flyer 
miles? Or, are they just insensitive to price? Although our model does not enable us to 
answer these questions, others have considered them. Borenstein (1989) and 
Morrison and Winston (1989) showed that an airline which has a large market share 
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Table 5 
City-Pair Airline Marketing Mix Analysis 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Ratio 
Airline Firm Intercepts (a,): 
BRANIFF -0.255 0.0725 -3.513 " 
CONTINENTAL 0.61 7 0.0523 11,784 " 
DELTA -0.1 32 0.0571 -2.304 " 
EASTERN 0.239 0.0563 4.244 " 
MIDWAY 1.037 0.0768 13.499 " 
MIXED -0.680 0.1236 -5.506 " 
NORTHWEST -0.240 0.0482 -4.978 
PAN AM 0.368 0.0923 3.990 " 
PEOPLE'S EXPRS 0.321 0.091 3 3.513 " 
PIEDMONT -0.140 0.0854 -1.634 
REPUBLIC -0.657 0.0556 -1 1.823 " 
TWA -0.205 0.0593 -3.453 " 
UNITED 0.335 0.0506 6.631 "* 
USAlR -0.926 0.0578 -1.600 
WESTERN -0.1 13 0.1 086 -1.040 " 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Marketing Mix Variables (a: 
ADV-EXP 0.340E-09 0.1 67E-08 0.203 
#-DEPARTS 0.563E-04 0.277E-05 20.355" 
FARE 0.483E-02 0.884E-03 5.465" 
STRIKE -0.1 3394 0.638E-01 -2.101" 
CRS-L0Ct.r 0.288E-01 0.1 55E-02 1 8.574" 
----1-------1------------------------------------------------*------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: 
"*=pc.O?, **=p<.05 and*=p<.10 
Model fit: R' = 56.7%; Adjusted R' = 56.2%; F[19,2289] = 15.71 
Data: 2309 annual observations, spanning 4 years (1 984-1 987) for 72 non-hub city-pairs. 
k=1, ... K marketing mix variables, and i=l  ,..., l airlines; all "small carriers" omitted. 
Intercepts: None for American Airlines included to avoid perfect collinearity; through its 
omission, American acts as base case comparison for other carriers. 
Heteroskedasticity: Diagnosed via the Breusch-Pagan (1979) Lagrange multiplier test for 
' the hypothesis that the model is homoskedastic, i.e., y =O in Var[~, ] = 02,= 0 2 f ( ~ +  y'z,), with 
z representing a vector of exogenous variables. The value of X2 was 152.08 with 19 degrees 
of freedom, Thus, we rejected homoskedasticity at the 1 % level. 
Alternate Estimation Method: Based on the observation that firm size might account for 
heteroskedasticity, we ran a second, less general test attributable to Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1965), in which the source of the heteroskedasticity is assumed to be known (e.g., Vat-(€, ] = 
02, = dmI, a,=#-DEPARTS). Rejecting homoskedasticity again, we performed the related 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression (Greene, 1990). The WLS coefficient estimate for 
CRS-LOC was unchanged in both magnitude and significance level. Additionally, similar 
effects were retained for three of the four other core marketing mix variables in WLS 
estimation, while the variance explained by the model declined to approximately 37%. 
Although the Goldfeld-Quandt test results are consistent with firm size as a causal factor for 
heteroskedasticity, the test does not provide proof: we cannot rule out the possibility that 
other omitted variables produce heteroskedasticity. 
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a particular city-pair is able to raise its prices. It has also been estimated that frequent 
flyer programs have raised ticket prices by 10% to 15% (Stephenson and Fox, 1992). 
4.4. Implications 
The results of the city-pair analysis support Hypothesis I, which predicts an 
association between the installed base of CRS locations in a market and the firm's 
market share. We believe the results illustrate how indirect benefits strengthened 
the vendors' ability to appropriate value from their investments in CRS through focused, 
market-specific efforts to create an installed base. The strength of the association with 
appropriability can be gauged by estimating the leverage that is created on market 
share for various levels of CRS deployment in capturing revenue passenger miles 
relative to the competition: 
The marginal value in market share terms of a competitor's in,stalled base of CRS 
relative to its competition in the marketplace can be computed by transforming the 
partial derivative of market share with respect to lagged CRS locations 
) back to its raw impact on market share. ( dr*w_roct-*  
It is also easy to solve for the size of the installed base of CRS locations that 
maximizes elasticity of market share, x , " ~ ~ , , _ , ,  , for each of the markets included in 
the analysis. This solution indicates whether critical mass deployment was reached 
in a given market, and allows management to estimate the efficiency of the agency 
automation strategy in strengthening appropriability. 
The interpretative power of such comparative statics analysis is limited by its ceteris 
paribus assumption. By holding "all else constant," one may not recognize the 
dynamics leading to equilibrium outcomes for firm market shares. 
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5. THE INDUSTRY LEVEL: MODEL AND RESULTS 
The second hypothesis to be addressed in this research is whether CRS 
vendors' attempts to appropriate the indirect benefits from CRS deployment in travel 
agencies is related to the vendors' overall performance at an industry level. 
5.1. The Industry Model 
To answer this question, we tested a model with the variables shown in Table 1 
using three dependent variables: 
LOAD factor: a measure of efficiency; 
RPM, revenue passenger miles: a measure of revenue generation (measured 
in millions of miles); and, 
Operating PROFIT: a measure of financial performance (measured in 
thousands of dollars). 
The three variables described above are modeled as a function of: 
CRS-LOC, the number of travel agent locations using each CRS; 
average STAGE length for each carrier (the average length in miles of all of the 
airline's flights between city-pairs); 
number of departures, #-DEPARTS, for each carrier; and, 
advertising expenditures, AD-EXP, for each carrier (measured in thousands). 
The functional form of the industry model is? 
where 
Yt 
- 
- a dependent variable, representing load factor (LOAD), 
revenue passenger miles (RPM) and operating profit 
(PROFIT) in year t, in three separate estimations; 
a1 
- 
- a regression constant; 
We evaluated whether an additive separable specification of the national model was more 
appropriate than a log-linear (i.e., Cobb-Douglas) specification for this data. Our selection of an 
additive model was supported by the results of Davidson and MacKinnon's J-test (1981). 
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- PI, ..., P4 - coefficients for the independent variables; and, 
& t  
- 
- a normally distributed, time-dependent error term. 
The variable for the number of agencies in which the airline has reservation terminals, 
CRS-LOCI is lagged one year following the same logic as the city-pair model. 
5.2. Estimation Issues 
Data for testing the industry model cover the time period 1976 to 1987 for the 
CRS vendor airlines listed earlier in the paper and the following non-CRS vendor 
airlines: Piedmont, Northwest, USAir, Continental and Western. We used LIMDEP, 
which enabled us to test for problems with the data that we discussed earlier that make 
OLS estimates unreliable. We also tested a "fixed effectsJ' variation of our model, that 
included dummy variables for panel groupings, in this case each airline. When 
appropriate, we computed the generalized least squares (GLS) solution to obtain 
statistics to identify the extent to which autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross- 
sectional groups exist in the data. LIMDEP provides a number of statistics that suggest 
which model has more efficient coefficient estimates. Note that the industry model 
involves 10 airlines for 12 years, less one year for a lagged variable; therefore all 
models are estimated using 1 10 observations. 
5.3. Results and Discussion 
Equations 6 through 8 present the results of estimating the model in Equation 5. 
All three of the models required the use of generalized least squares  estimate^.^ 
 h he government attempted to eliminate screen bias in 1984, a possible explanation for the 
advantages gained by an airline by having travel agents use its CRS. We also estimated 
equations 6-8 using a dummy variable for the slope of the CRS-LOC variable for the years 
before and after the elimination of screen bias. The results showed no significant difference in 
the slope of this independent variable after the elimination of bias. It is likely that the 
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RPMt = -14,904 + 1.16 CRS-LOC,, + 2.60E01 STAGEt 
(-10.53)*** (8.40)*** (1 3.37)*** 
Model = GLS; R2 = .96; t values in parentheses beneath the coefficient, 
with *** =p<.OI, ** =p<.05 and * = p  c.10. 
LOAD, = 49.90 + 5.10E-04 CRS-LOCI-, + 8.37E-03 STAGEt 
(1 9.68)*** (2.05)** (2.40)** 
Model = GLS; R2 = .27. 
+ 1.07 # DEPARTS, - 1.89 AD-EXPI 
(7 .33P (-.43) 
Model = GLS; R2 = .63. 
The CRS-LOC variable is significant in each of the equations above, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. The model suggests that the airline strategy of placing its terminals in 
travel agencies has been highly successful. 
5.4. Testing for Simultaneity 
Our belief is that an airline CRS placed in a travel agent's office leads to higher 
levels of revenue passenger miles, a greater load factor and higher profits. An 
alternative explanation for the findings is that only strong or large airlines can afford to 
develop a CRS and that these airlines would exhibit continued high performance 
regardless of agency automation. How plausible is this alternative explanation? 
From a modeling standpoint, this question raises the issue of causality and 
simultaneity. Many research models predict causal relationships: a simple production 
advantages to having a CRS in a travel agent's office exceed the obvious benefits of display 
bias. 
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function suggests that output is caused by capital, labor and materials. Demonstrating 
causality with empirical research is problematic and is heavily influenced by research 
design. We believe that research only provides evidence that causality may exist; it 
removes doubt that variables are completely independent. An experimental research 
design in which the researcher controls and manipulates the independent variable 
provides the most evidence that a causal relationship may exist. A field study with 
longitudinal data falls between the laboratory experiment and cross-sectional research 
in addressing causality. 
In empirical research of the kind we present in this study, the closest we can 
come to controlling and manipulating an independent variable is by making choices 
about the econometric analysis to reflect our understanding of industry dynamics. It 
seems reasonable, considering the airline industry and CRSs during the time period of 
our study, that the CRS locations and airline performance variables may simultaneously 
cause one another. To model this possibility, we specified a system of simultaneous 
equations involving the pairing of Equations 6 through 8 with an equation in which 
LOAD, PROFIT and RPM are used to predict CRS locations, eliminating the lag on the 
CRS locations variab~e.~ 
Such a formulation requires a substantial change in our underlying model: we can no longer 
lag the CRS locations variable to match our belief about how long it takes for IT to have an 
impact following its deployment. (It also would not make sense to use performance measures at 
time t to predict CRS locations at time t-I .) We should only include those airlines for analysis 
where the possibility of simultaneity actually existed. During the period of the study, the most 
successful automation vendors were United and American Airlines; the weaker CRS vendors 
during this period were Eastern and TWA. Delta was financially sound, but had smaller market 
share. These airlines yield twelve years of data for five carriers; however, not all of the airlines 
in the data set set actually deployed CRS at the beginning of the time period of the study, 
reducing the total to 48 observations. 
We analyzed the structural equations in each of three models using two stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions, one that included fixed effects to capture group-wise 
heteroskedasticity, and a second that included random effects to capture time-specific shocks in 
the market during the period of our data. The results were consistent with our findings in 
Equations 6 through 8. However, we do not present the results of the 2SLS analysis because (1) 
they do not allow for the time-lagged impacts of CRS that we think belong in the model, (2) the 
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The results of the analysis described above did not provide additional 
information beyond what we believe to be the most parsimonious explanation of 
simultaneous causation. Agencies are typically automated during the year, and it is 
most likely that the airline's performance in a prior year influences its automation 
budget. Therefore, we lagged the dependent variables in Equations 6 through 8 to 
predict the number of CRS locations, and estimated a model on the basis of 48 
observations, obtaining Equation 9: 
Model = Generalized Least Squares, 48 observations, R~ = .15. 
Revenue passenger miles is the best predictor of CRS investment, suggesting 
that larger airlines had the resources to develop competitive CRS and to deploy them in 
agencies. The weaker finding that higher load factors are associated with a smaller 
number of CRS locations may indicate that something other than CRS deployment is 
associated with greater levels of efficiency, such as route structure or type of 
equipment. The lack of significance for profitability adds to the argument that size 
matters more than performance in predicting agency automation. However, it should 
be noted that these three variables only explain 15% of the variance in agency 
automation.' 
2SLS results are weaker than those from our primary model, and (3) there is significant 
autocorrelation present in the analysis. (To eliminate autocorrelation, an alternative analytic 
approach is to first-difference our data prior to the 2SLS. However, the relatively small number 
of observations we have at the national level makes this would further reduce the number of 
observations from 48 to 36.) 
'1f the dependent and independent variables in the industry model are compared for United and 
American versus other CRS vendors versus other airlines in the study, the results are consistent. 
For example, during the period United and American had an average load factor of 62.7%' other 
CRS vendors 58.8% and other airlines 57.3%. The results for the other variables are identical in 
terms of ranking. United and American have the highest revenue passenger mile figures, 
number of departures, longest stage length, advertising and operating profits, followed by other 
CRS vendors followed by the non CRS vendors. These data are also consistent with the findings 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
While we have attempted to perform a rigorous and careful analysis, there are 
several threats to the validity of our study. First, we were not able to obtain data or 
include overrides airlines pay to travel agents to stimulate bookings; it is possible that 
this omitted variable has an influence on market share. The structure of our model with 
lagged variables does not lend itself well to simultaneous equations estimation 
approaches, though it is likely that investment in CRS deployment and airline 
performance exhibit some joint causality. However, we do not feel that these problems 
are severe enough to alter the conclusions one can draw from the study, particularly 
given the consistent results between two different models using independent estimates 
of CRS locations and two different levels of analysis. 
The results suggest that healthy airlines were able to appropriate the benefits of 
their investments in IT through agency automation strategies. The CRS vendors 
reached a critical mass in various cities which allowed them to increase market share. 
Market share in turn led to stronger performance on the national level. These airlines 
had to decide to take the risk to invest in technology and agency automation (Clemons, 
1991). Even though American was healthy, deciding to undertake the SABRE system 
was difficult. Max Hopper, senior vice president of American, described the context of 
the initial SABRE development decision:1° 
"The initial investment in development costs was $40 million.. .the figure 
was equivalent to the cost of four Boeing 707s, which was the largest 
plane flying in those days ... If we had bought aircraft instead, it would 
have been a 20% increase in the existing jet fleet. So, diverting our 
capital from jets to exotic technology.. . was a very major commitment and 
a significant financial risk for us as a company." 
of Banker and Johnston (1 995) who found that American and United benefited more from their 
CRS than other CRS vendors. 
'%ideotaped comments at an NYU seminar on November 3, 1992. 
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The major CRS vendors obtained direct benefits in the form of travel agent 
charges and booking fees, and indirect benefits as shown from the data in this study. 
The airlines also turned their CRS into highly successful specialized assets (Teece, 
1987), platforms that became travel "supermarkets." It would indeed be difficult for an 
imitator today to create the specialized asset of a SABRE or APOLLO reservations 
system on which to offer more travel-related services. The value of this specialized 
asset became clear in August of 1996 when American turned SABRE into a subsidiary 
and sold part of it to the public. The overall market value of American Airlines at that 
time was $6.2 billion and the initial public offering of SABRE valued the subsidiary at 
about $3 billion, nearly half of the airline's market value! 
This study supports our original hypotheses and makes three contributions to 
our knowledge about the value of IT investments: 
1. CRS locations were a significant predictor of four measures of airline 
performance, in contrast with Borenstein's (1 989) findings that CRS deployment 
was not significant in predicting market share. 
2. CRS locations were significant in a MNL model over four years, building on 
Banker and Johnston's MCI model, and refining the manner in which elasticity of 
market share and critical mass are modeled; CRS locations were also significant 
in a national model using 12 years of data. 
3. An effective corporate strategy, like CRS deployment in travel agencies, 
allows a firm to appropriate substantial indirect benefits in addition to the direct 
returns normally anticipated from an investment in information technology. 
The results from the city-pair market share analysis and the industry model are 
consistent in supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2: the presence of a CRS vendor's system 
in a travel agency is associated with greater market share and with higher levels of 
airline performance. This study has found one of the strongest relationships to date 
between information technology and firm performance. Moreover, it has done so 
through analysis at two different levels with data from multiple sources, employed two 
models, and has used careful testing for possible defects in the analysis. The results 
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also provide evidence that a n  investment in information technology h a s  indirect 
benefits, in this instance through the  growth in installed b a s e  of C R S  terminals in travel 
agencies. 
Senior managers and  academic researchers find that it can b e  very difficult to 
evaluate the  impact of investments in information technology. The  results of this 
research suggest  that it is possible to discover significant benefits from information 
technology a t  multiple levels of analysis. In this study, the results help u s  understand 
the  indirect benefits of airline C R S  beyond the  direct impact of the  booking fees the  
CRS vendor receives from other airlines. It appears  that deploying IT in travel 
agencies  h a s  helped C R S  vendors appropriate the  benefits of IT innovations. We 
believe that other firms can and  have obtained similar advantages,  though it c a n  b e  a 
challenge to  demonstrate that technology w a s  responsible. While it is difficult to 
estimate possible indirect benefits when evaluating a n  IT innovation, management  
should be aware  that such benefits d o  occur; they may in fact turn out t o  provide the  
largest return on  a n  IT investment. 
Appendix A: Econometr ic  Specification fo r  t h e  City-Pair Model 
T h e  multinomial logit (MNL) city-pair model requires transformation prior to  
estimation (Cooper and  Nakanishi, 1988). T o  simplify the  notation, w e  indicate t h e  K-1 
non-CRS variables with Xkict a n d  the  lagged C R S  locations variable with XCRS-LOC,~~,~-$. 
T h e  subscripts indicate the  marketing mix variables k for airline i a t  time t, with the  
exception that C R S  locations is lagged o n e  year. The  model in simplified notation is: 
f (~kict ;xCRS-LOC,~~,~-~) MSict = 1 (Al) 
C f o(kict ; XCRS_LOC,~~,~-?) 
i = 1 
T h e  MNL form of the model incorporates a n  exponential attractiveness function of the  
marketing mix variables: 
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K-1 
e ( ~ i  + C P k  X K ~  + PCRS-Lm XCR%LOC,~C,~-I + ~ i c t )  
MSict= I k = 1 K-1 
C e ( ~ i  + C P k  Xkict + PcRs-LoC XCRS-LOC,~~,~-~ + ~ i c t )  
i = l  k = l  
Included in this model are airline constants, a i ,  for each firm as well as error terms, eict, 
that pertain to the airline i, the city-pair c, and the time period t. 
Transformation of this expression for estimation involves taking the logs of both 
sides, and centering market share on its geometric mean and the independent 
variables on their arithmetic means: 
where 
11 1 
MS:, = log [ M S i c t  
i = l  
* J 11 
= a, + C (aj -al -& ) dj, with dj = 1 if j=i and 0 otherwise (A71 
j = 2 
* I 
~j = Ei- C& i / I  (A8) 
i = l  
The log-centered dependent variable is denoted with an asterisk. The 
dependent variables that are marked with asterisks indicate differences from the 
arithmetic means of the variables. The term ~ * ~ i ~  indicates the difference between the 
value of marketing mix variable k (for example advertising expenditures) for airline i in 
city-pair c during time t and the average of this variable's values for all competing 
airlines operating on this route during that period. When this difference is positive, the 
marketing mix variable has a beneficial impact on market share, provided its parameter 
estimate is positive. The most direct interpretation of the coefficient can be made in the 
context of the market share elasticity expression, presented earlier, which enables the 
computation of the percentage increase in market share for a unit change in an 
independent variable. 
" The effect of the variable d, here is to ensure that there is only one non-zero airline intercept 
term for each airline i. 
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The reader should note that this model includes a set of airline-specific intercept 
terms, denoted by ai , which leads to a very large number of variables to estimate when 
there are many airlines. Because models of this sort were initially developed for use 
with scanner data in the context of brand management, it is important to ensure that a 
sufficient number of observations exist for each airline i included in the panel data set. 
If there are insufficient observations, the intercept terms will either be highly unstable, 
or it will be impossible to create parameter estimates for the model as a whole. 
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